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It is healthy, I believe, to periodically examine the
way in which a field’s activity is supposed to be valu-
able, both internally, to those within the field itself,
but also externally to the wider scientific community
in which it is embedded, and ultimately society at
large. Otherwise, there may be a tendency for modes
or styles of work to lock in and be perpetuated uncriti-
cally. However, it is clear that such a process of cri-
tique must take care with how it defines what counts
as valuable. If the definition is cast too close to the
community being examined, there is a risk of swal-
lowing a motivating story that may perhaps be inter-
nally consistent and widely accepted within the
community, but does not survive scrutiny from a more
critical perspective. Eugenic science might be cited as
an example. Its value relies on subscribing to a set of
background assumptions that should themselves be
part of any critique. On the other hand, the value of
many scientific activities would be difficult to discern
from too remote a vantage point. What exactly is the
value to future generations of investing in the study of
a particular mollusk, for instance? 
Here, Webb’s sights are trained on the “synthetic
methodology,” and in particular a specific sub-com-
munity involved in building systems that are intended
to shed light on biological questions. Consequently
the sense of value that Webb is concerned with is
largely derived from the aims of biological science,
which seems fair enough. However, I believe that there
is a problem in the scoping here, which I will return to
below.
In large part, however, I am in agreement with
Webb’s line of argument and the useful distinctions
that she makes between different motivating stories
that can be found throughout the ALife and adaptive
behavior literatures. I share her sense that the things
being built should be thought of as models, and that
they are therefore models of something. This mindset
should always make us wary of systems that are pre-
sented as artificial worlds worthy of study for their
own sake—free-floating models that have been dis-
connected from the target systems that they were orig-
inally motivated by. I agree that the animats built by
the community under consideration, whether simula-
tions or fabrications, do instantiate or represent hypoth-
eses about nature, and that, as such, their value is
intimately tied up in which hypotheses are represented
and to what end. Where animat behavior challenges
our ideas in a way that can be empirically tested, it is,
or should be, taking part in a scientific cycle of theory–
hypothesis–experiment–theory (Di Paolo, Noble, &
Bullock, 2000).
However, I do not agree with the repeated assertion
running through the article that the biological relevance
of a model must be cashed out in terms of whether or
not it speaks to the properties of a specific animal or
species. This position seems to reflect Webb’s own
interests in biological mechanisms. How does it mani-
fest itself? In the abstract: “Animat simulations ... rep-
resent hypotheses about ... animals”. Later: “But if the
results of animat models are to be relevant to biology,
then ultimately some claim about the physical mecha-
nisms of real animals must be asserted.” (sec. 4.2).
This idea leads Webb to assume that because Beer
claims that his work “has important implications for
our understanding of perception” it must also be the
case that “empirical claims are being made about the
world on the basis of the model results” (sec. 3.5).
I think this move is made too quickly and is
overly narrow. 
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Consider the Hawk–Dove game (Maynard Smith,
1982). This is presented by Maynard Smith as a math-
ematical model, but could also be instantiated as a
simulation or even perhaps with robots. It is also,
indisputably, a model with biological relevance. But it
does not achieve this relevance by being a model of
hawks, doves, or any particular animal or species of
animal. In its simplest form, the model presents an
evolutionary game in which two strategies for resolv-
ing conflict may be adopted: Hawk or Dove. Hawks
are aggressive and will fight to resolve a conflict.
Doves are pacifist and will back down when attacked.
Game-theoretic analysis demonstrates that neither strat-
egy is evolutionarily stable. In particular, although a
population of Doves settles disputes most efficiently
(in terms of achieving the minimum average net cost
per dispute), such a population can be invaded by
Hawks that bring conflict and its attendant high costs.
While, like the work of Beer and Webb, the Hawk–
Dove model features idealizations of animal behavior,
it is cast at the level of evolutionary adaptation. The
lessons that it delivers concern our understanding of
the biological world and the species that make it up,
but do not speak to the properties of any particular
species or animal (rather they shed light on the vulner-
ability of cooperation to exploitation and the way in
which group-level benefits can be evolutionarily
undermined by short-sighted individualism). As such,
the Hawk–Dove game is an example of a kind of model
that has value without making claims about “the physi-
cal mechanisms of real animals” and is therefore out-
side the scope of Webb’s analysis.
Might pieces of modeling work within ALife or
adaptive behavior also have value without shedding
light on particular biological mechanisms within ani-
mal species? At first glance it might appear that mod-
els of evolutionary adaptation such as the Hawk–Dove
game are a special case in this respect since evolution-
ary adaptation is an overarching process that organ-
izes biological phenomena, whereas the majority of
biology is concerned with understanding and explain-
ing these phenomena, for example, cricket phono-
taxis, arthropod digestion, insect cognition, and so
forth. However, closer inspection reveals that even the
most species-specific mechanism can be the subject of
biological enquiry that does not seek to shed light on
the causal mechanisms themselves, but on, say, their
functional role within an organism (Tinbergen, 1963).
This explains how biologists could study some behav-
ioral phenomenon in ignorance of any mechanistic
account of how it is achieved (e.g., Tinbergen’s own
work on the functional value of imprinting behaviors in
birds, or, say, the evolutionary theory of the sex ratio).
Consequently, might not Beer’s work on cogni-
tion and perception, or other ALife/adaptive behavior
work on the origins of life, action selection, metabo-
lism, group selection, and so forth, have “important
implications for our understanding” of these phenom-
ena without engaging with the particularities of how
they are brought about by specific biological mecha-
nisms? How are such models relevant to biology if
they do not directly shed light on biological mecha-
nisms? They are relevant in the same way that all
well-formed biological models are relevant: they
engage with extant biological ideas.
In fact models must always be resident within the
“world of ideas.” They do not take part in empirical sci-
ence in the same way that an experiment does, provid-
ing evidence about the world. Instead they take part
indirectly by re-presenting the theoretical ideas that
were stimulated by empirical discoveries and steering
further exploration. As such, the opposition between
animats (models) and animals (target systems) pre-
sented in the title of Webb’s article is spurious: Webb
is not advocating that we build animals instead of ani-
mats. She would like us to build models with a clear
role to play within biology, rather than animats that
elide the difference between technological achieve-
ment and scientific value. At the same time as sup-
porting this position, we should reserve a valid role for
models that aim at exploring phenomena abstracted
from the biological mechanisms that implement them
in nature.
This is not to say that the process of abstraction is
unproblematic. Maynard Smith has claimed that in
specifying an ESS model, rather than ignoring or side-
stepping the problem of engaging with the mechanis-
tic, developmental or biochemical basis of behavior,
the modeler is being forced to make explicit her posi-
tion on what is within the remit of the model: Hawk
behavior and Dove behavior, but not time-travelling
behavior or magic behavior or the use of advanced
logics, brute computation, and so on. An ESS model
that posits behavioral strategies that do not make
sense in the light of empirical observations of relevant
living systems is vulnerable to being dismissed as a
consequence. Famously, abstracting the properties
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empirical observations of known living creatures is
hamstrung by an inability to identify just such proper-
ties. Closer to the work being critiqued by Webb,
Beer’s notion of a minimally cognitive task cannot be
evaluated outside the context of a particular set of bio-
logical mechanisms (Fine, Di Paolo, & Izquierdo, 2007).
Consider that a foraging task that requires “memory” in
one agent might be solved without it in another agent
that has access to real-time satellite photography of
the foraging patch. 
However, in appearing to favor animals over ani-
mats, Webb’s title does (I believe accidentally) evoke
a concerning tendency to begin to believe that we can
build real instances of target systems, and thereby
achieve direct empirical biological significance—that
we can do “experiments” within simulations, that there
can be a virtual laboratory, an in silico empiricism. This
is to take Webb’s approach too far (something that I do
not believe she has ever done herself)—to claim that
the synthetic methodology is or should be a route to
empirical data on systems that are difficult or expen-
sive to assay in vivo. While we should strive for mod-
els that have relevance to animals (or plants, fungi,
etc.), either mechanistically or, as briefly argued here,
in a more abstract manner, we should not confuse this
with some practice of building models that are ani-
mals.
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